ABSTRACT: This paper examines the geopolitical dimensions of China's strategy to internationalise the renminbi (RMB) and reduce reliance on the U.S. dollar. Far from a purely financial initiative, RMB internationalisation is a strategic response to the geopolitical and economic risks of a dollar-centric order. Through instruments such as the petroyuan, bilateral currency swaps, the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System, and the digital yuan, China seeks to embed the RMB within global trade, investment, and payment infrastructures. Anchored in geopolitical frameworks such as the Belt and Road Initiative and BRICS+ cooperation, these efforts form part of a wider strategy to extend China's economic influence and reduce exposure to dollar weaponisation. While the RMB's role in global reserves remains limited, China's selective and incremental approach prioritises trade-based internationalisation over capital account liberalisation. Set against accelerating de-dollarisation and deepening multipolarity, the paper analyses how China's RMB strategy is reshaping global systems of exchange, across finance, trade, and payments.

ABSTRACT: The launch of yuan-denominated crude oil futures in 2018 marked a significant step in the renminbi’s internationalisation, offering an alternative to the US dollar in the global energy trade. The historical context of the petrodollar system—established through an agreement between the United States and Saudi Arabia in the mid-1970s—further entrenched and sustained the US dollar’s status as the global reserve currency after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system. The emergence of the petroyuan reflects China’s ambition to challenge the longstanding dominance of the petrodollar, underscoring the shift towards a more multipolar world. While the petroyuan is unlikely to displace the dollar, its introduction reflects broader geopolitical and economic reconfigurations, potentially adding complexity and friction to global financial and energy transactions.

ABSTRACT: This article examines the evolution of Slovakia-Taiwan relations, focusing on the early 2020s (specifically 2020–2023), a period marked by a shift toward closer ties. Despite adhering to the One China policy, Slovakia has strengthened its engagement with Taiwan, driven by both regional and domestic factors. Regionally, the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) region’s disillusionment with unmet Chinese economic promises has led to a pivot toward alternative partnerships, including Taiwan. Domestically, Slovakia’s 2020 government shift introduced a more Taiwan-receptive policy, aligning with the EU and NATO’s cautious approach to China. The analysis highlights Slovakia’s adoption of a low-visibility, pragmatic model that contrasts with the high-profile symbolic approaches of fellow CEE ‘vanguard’ states (the most active players in political interactions with Taiwan) like Czechia and Lithuania. Slovakia’s strategy involves pursuing a ‘positive’ agenda with Taiwan with minimal public attention, redirecting criticisms of China to parliamentary channels and conducting symbolic actions vis-à-vis China. While this approach reduces risks of Chinese backlash and minimises domestic politicisation, it also limits public awareness and support. Nonetheless, the Slovakia-Taiwan relationship has seen tangible, durable gains. Slovakia's approach offers a viable blueprint for other states interested in engaging with Taiwan without provoking China.

ABSTRACT: Since the 1980s, a widely held view within the scholarly literature has been that China’s political system is characterised by‘fragmented authoritarianism’ (FA). According to the FA model, the central government’s power is limited by competing interestsamong a diversity of actors within the Chinese state. These actors include central government ministries and bureaucracies, local governments, and corporations, which bargain for influence over policy direction, leading to incoherence and inconsistency indecision-making. In this paper, we aim to demonstrate that the FA framework is misleading in the realm of foreign policy, especially in the era of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In its place, we characterise China’s decision-making and policy implementation system as flexible authoritarianism. Although actors such as corporations and local governments have a considerable degree of autonomy, they are responsible primarily for policy implementation, to which they can make adjustments within a set of broadly defined boundaries. Long-term strategic goals defined by the Party leadership are combined with elements of neoliberal free-market economics and applied with a remarkable degree of consistency. We illustrate the argument through evidence and case studies from Chinese foreign policy during the BRI era.

ABSTRACT: The Rohingya population is widely acknowledged as one of the most persecuted minority groups worldwide. The ongoing tripartite conflict involving the Rohingya, the Rakhine, and the Myanmar military has resulted in numerous clashes and massacres, leading to forced displacement. Countries such as Bangladesh, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Pakistan, and India have recorded an influx of Rohingya immigrants. While extensive studies have been conducted on the Rohingya in Myanmar and Bangladesh, there has been a limited scholarly focus on the Rohingya in India. This article aims to fill this gap in the literature. It is important to note that India is neither a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention nor the 1967 Protocol, which addresses refugee status and protections, nor does it have a domestic refugee law. Consequently, refugees in India are not officially recognized as a distinct group and lack legal protection against exploitation and abuse. This situation leaves them vulnerable to various forms of mistreatment, including exploitation, violence, and limited access to employment, education, and healthcare. Although the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees designates the Rohingya as refugees, the current Bharatiya Janata Party government views this stateless community as illegal migrants and a perceived threat to India. This stance raises important questions: (i) How does the Indian population perceive and internalize this interpretation? (ii) What are their attitudes toward the Rohingya, and what policy options do they prefer? To address these inquiries, the authors of this article analyzed data from the Sinophone Borderlands Indo-Pacific Survey, a large-scale online survey organized by one of the authors. In addition, interviews were conducted with Rohingya individuals residing in India to gather firsthand perspectives.

ABSTRACT: Like many other countries in the Global South, the Philippines is in dire need of foreign investments and loans to develop its infrastructure. Former President Rodrigo Duterte (2016–2022) sought close cooperation with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to complement his ambitious Build! Build! Build! program. His successor Ferdinand Marcos Jr. continued many BRI projects, but canceled others, due to lack of funding from China and increased tensions in the South China Sea. Moreover, he deepened cooperation with the European Union (EU) in security and infrastructure, thereby benefiting from the EU’s Global Gateway Initiative (GGI). The findings of this study, which is theoretically located at the intersection of foreign, economic, and domestic politics, build strongly on a representative survey conducted in the Philippines in 2022. One of the major findings is the occurrence of perceptions of the Philippine citizens and elites of China and the EU that are strongly in line with each other. Another finding is the extent of the Filipinos’ ability to differentiate between “good”, “bad”, and “beautiful” effects of BRI projects despite their negative attitude towards China. Conversely, even though the EU is seen in a very positive light, the study concludes that the GGI can only then become an additional infrastructure offer, if the GGI projects bring tangible benefits to the Filipinos. Both the BRI and the GGI illustrate that offering infrastructure collaboration is strongly based on geopolitical and geo-economic reasoning, but that the recipient can utilize this fact to further its economic interests.

ABSTRACT: This essay explores the purpose, progress, and strategic political motivations driving China’s development of the digital yuan. This central bank digital currency is not merely a technological advancement or modernisation of a fiat currency, it also serves as a key instrument in the agenda of the People’s Bank of China to consolidate monetary authority. The essay analyses the development of the digital yuan in the context of China’s broader economic and political strategies, including enhancing financial inclusion, centralising the nation’s payment ecosystem - currently dominated by private fintech players - and potentially challenging the US dollar’s global dominance. It also assesses its possible impacts on international trade, while addressing the challenges it faces in gaining global acceptance.

ABSTRACT: Combining international relations and critical geopolitics literature with a public opinion survey in Thailand that delves into some rarely explored and sensitive questions to understand respondents’ political views and attitudes, we examine the extent to which domestic political developments can be understood through a United States–China great power lens. Are politically progressive Thais more likely to be pro-US, and more politically conservative Thais likely to favor China? While we find some relationship between liberal domestic political leanings and sympathy for the United States, we also show that conservative domestic political leanings do not automatically translate into support for China. To view election outcomes in a country such as Thailand as “wins” for one or other great power would be highly misleading.

ABSTRACT: The Dalai Lama’s absence from Taiwan since 2009, attributed to mounting pressure from China, has not deterred the persistent calls from the Taiwanese populace for his visit. However, the extent to which this desire represents a mainstream or minority viewpoint remains unclear. This raises questions about the motivations behind the Taiwanese people’s appeals for the Dalai Lama to visit the country. Is this driven by religious sentiments, or is it politically motivated? To explore these questions, the authors propose a hypothesis that suggests a dual motivation for pro-green individuals advocating the Dalai Lama’s visit—namely, a blend of religious and political inclinations, encompassing pro-Taiwan independence sentiments and opposition to the Chinese Communist Party. On the other hand, for pro-blue supporters favouring the Dalai Lama’s invitation, the primary motivation appears to lean more towards religious considerations. This paper draws its insights from a comprehensive survey project, the Sinophone Borderlands Survey, conducted in Taiwan during May and June 2022.

ABSTRACT: Attempting to understand the strategic motives and geopolitical interests behind Chinese actions in bilateral international relations, this paper examines Beijing’s reaction to the 2021 Myanmar Coup. Adopting a rationalist approach, the paper conducts cost and benefit analysis through game-theoretical lenses and categorizes Chinese interests as expansionary and defensive, both contributing to its potential payoff in bilateral exchanges. Applying the resulted model to the Post-Coup Sino-Myanmar interactions in which Beijing’s attitude shifted from the initial ambiguity to more favorable stance towards the Tatmadaw, the authors find that such shift can be attributed to a changing reality of China’s perceived political and economic outcomes at different time periods. In addition to offering insights into ongoing China-Myanmar relations, this article identifies key patterns of the decision-making process taken by Beijing. It argues that, when countries engage with China bilaterally, they will likely face a more volatile, daring player willing to take more controversial actions

ABSTRACT: This chapter looks closely at the evolution of Taiwan’s relations with Burma/Myanmar, especially in the past ten years. When Taiwan embarked on its path to democratization, Burma/Myanmar was still under authoritarian rule with strong geopolitical influence coming from its large neighbor, China. Myanmar’s close alliance with China – the paukpaw (fraternal) relationship – constituted an obstacle for Taiwan to deepen relations with Myanmar. Nevertheless, there were still some economic and socio-cultural links, including Taiwan being home to a large, mostly Chinese-speaking, Myanmar community. A more engaging environment was created with the economic liberalization and the top-down transition to discipline-flourishing democracy (as the military termed it) in the 2010s in Myanmar and with the New Southbound Policy in Taiwan. Following the exchange of representative offices in 2016, economic and people-to-people links intensified. Still, the relationship was very cautious, especially in political terms, with Taiwan remaining quiet on the Rohingya issue. Following the military coup in Myanmar in 2021, Taiwan took a (mostly rhetorically) tougher line against the new military regime and accepted a parliamentary motion to criticize the coup. The Myanmar community in Taiwan came out to protest against the military, and the Milk Tea Alliance brought together campaigners from the region. While China has, with some hesitation in the beginning, increased cooperation with the Myanmar junta, Taiwan’s stance is attractive to the other side: the pro-democracy movement. Has Taiwan found a new way how to diffuse its co-optive power in Myanmar and bet on a value-based policy? Will this approach help Taiwan differentiate itself from China among the Myanmar people?

ABSTRACT: What accounts for the survival and long-term participation of activists in contentious movements under repression? I argue for the role of an important yet oft-neglected factor: protective support by civilian bystanders. I propose that, mainly motivated by victim-oriented sympathy, bystanders engage in high-risk protection that helps activists to escape crackdowns and bolsters their dedication to the movement. To test my theoretical claims, I examine hard cases for activist survival at the height of state violence during military rule in Myanmar between 1988 and 2010, with an original qualitative data set consisting of oral history interviews and written accounts by more than 100 protest observers and former pro-democracy activists. The data set presents an unprecedented number of voices from the average, non-contentious general public, which are mostly missing in existing research on social movements. This approach generates a fresh perspective to better understand opportunities and constraints around movement entrepreneurs in hostile environments.